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Abstract—Mobile crowdsensing engages a crowd of individuals
to use their mobile devices to cooperatively collect data about
social events and phenomena for special interest customers. It
can reduce the cost on sensor deployment and improve data
quality with human intelligence. To enhance data trustworthiness,
it is critical for service provider to recruit mobile users based
on their personal features, e.g., mobility pattern and reputation,
but it leads to the privacy leakage of mobile users. Therefore,
how to resolve the contradiction between user privacy and task
allocation is challenging in mobile crowdsensing. In this paper, we
propose SPOON, a strong privacy-preserving mobile crowdsens-
ing scheme supporting accurate task allocation from geographic
information and credit points of mobile users. In SPOON, the
service provider enables to recruit mobile users based on their
locations, and select proper sensing reports according to their
trust levels without invading user privacy. By utilizing proxy re-
encryption and BBS+ signature, sensing tasks are protected and
reports are anonymized to prevent privacy leakage. In addition, a
privacy-preserving credit management mechanism is introduced
to achieve decentralized trust management and secure credit
proof for mobile users. Finally, we show the security properties
of SPOON and demonstrate its efficiency on computation and
communication.
Keywords: Mobile Crowdsensing, Task Allocation, Trust Man-
agement, Privacy Preservation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of wireless communications and mobile
devices triggers the emergence of mobile crowdsensing [2], in
which user-centric mobile sensing and computing devices, e.g.,
smartphones, in-vehicle devices and wearable devices, are uti-
lized to sense, collect and process data from the environment.
This “Sensing as a Service” [3] elaborates our knowledge
of the physical world by opening up a new door for data
collection and sharing [4]. Due to the increasing popularity
of mobile devices, mobile crowdsensing supports a broad
range of sensing applications nowadays, ranging from social
recommendation, such as restaurant recommendation, parking
space discovery and indoor floor plan reconstrction [5], to
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environment monitoring, such as air quality measurement,
noise level detection and dam water release warning. With
human intelligence and user mobility, mobile crowdsensing
can significantly improve the trustworthiness of sensing data,
extend the scale of sensing applications and reduce the cost
on high-quality data collection [6].
While mobile crowdsensing makes data sensing appealing
than ever, it also brings new challenges towards mobile users,
one of which is privacy leakage, indicating that mobile crowd-
sensing puts the privacy of mobile users at stake [7], [8],
[9]. The sensing data collected from the surrounding areas
are necessarily people-centric and related to some aspects
of mobile users and their social setting: where they are
and where they are going; what places they are frequently
visited and what they are seeing; how their health status
is and which activity they prefer to do. Photos on social
events may expose the social relations, locations or even
political affiliations of mobile users. Furthermore, the more
sensing tasks mobile users engaged in and the richer data the
users contribute to, the higher probability that their sensitive
information may be exposed with. Therefore, preserving the
privacy of mobile users is the first-order security concern
in mobile crowdsensing. If there is no effective privacy-
preserving mechanism to protect the private information for
mobile users, it is of difficulty to motivate mobile users to join
in mobile crowdsensing services. In addition, the sensing tasks
may contain sensitive information about the customers who
issue them. Some personal information about the customers,
such as identities, locations, references and purchase inten-
tions, can be predicted by curious entities from the releasing
tasks. For example, a house agency may know Bob desire
to buy a house in a particular area if Bob releases tasks to
collect traffic condition and noise level in the neighborhood.
To preserve the privacy for both customers and mobile users,
several privacy-preserving mobile crowdsensing schemes [10],
[11], [12], [13] have been proposed by utilizing anonymity
techniques. Nevertheless, anonymity is insufficient for privacy
preservation, since the mobile users may be traced from travel
routes and social relations. It is possible to uniquely identify
35% of mobile users based on their top-two locations and
85% of them from their top-three locations based on a large
set of call data records provided by a US nationwide cell
operator [14]. Therefore, it is important to explore strong
privacy-preserving mechanisms to prevent privacy leakage for
customers and mobile users in mobile crowdsensing.
Once all information about mobile users and customers is
perfectly preserved, it is impossible for service providers to
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2accurately recruit mobile users for task performing, while task
allocation is a critical component in mobile crowdsensing to
ensure the quality of sensing results. Different from traditional
sensing networks, the produced data cannot be predicted as
a priori, and their trustworthiness totally depends on the
intelligence and behaviors of mobile users. In general, the
higher quality the sensing data have, the more efforts and
costs the mobile users should pay. Therefore, the set of mobile
users would directly impact the quality of sensing data. How
to identify the right groups of mobile users to produce the
desired data according to the targets of sensing tasks is a
complex problem from the service provider’s perspective.
Geography-based and reputation-based approaches are popular
in mobile crowdsensing to allocate tasks to mobile users, but
either has its inherent weaknesses. Firstly, reputation-based
task allocation mechanisms [11], [15], [16], [17] need a trusted
third party (TTP) to perform heavy reputation management
and are vulnerable to reputation-linking attacks, in which the
anonymous mobile users can be re-identified from their reputa-
tions. Secondly, geography-based task allocation schemes can
optimize users selection based on their spatial and temporal
correlation [18], but it discloses the content of sensing tasks
and the locations of mobile users to the service provider,
while location privacy is one of the primary concerns for
mobile users in pervasive environments. In summary, privacy
preservation and task allocation become a pair of contradictory
objectives in mobile crowdsensing.
To resolve this issue, we propose a Strong Privacy-
preserving mObile crOwdseNsing scheme (SPOON) support-
ing location-based task allocation, decentralized trust man-
agement and privacy preservation for both mobile users and
customers simultaneously. By leveraging blind signatures and
randomizable matrix multiplication, we fully prevent the pri-
vacy leakage from all sources for both mobile users and
customers, including locations, identities and credit points,
without scarifying the normal mobile crowdsensing services
of service providers, such as task allocation, data filtering and
trust management. The main contributions of this paper are
summarized as three folds:
• We design a privacy-preserving location matching mech-
anism based on matrix multiplication to allow service
providers to allocate sensing tasks based on the sensing
areas of tasks and the geographic locations of mobile
users. Specifically, the service provider can determine
whether a mobile user is in the sensing area of a task from
two randomized matrices generated from the sensing
area and the user’s location. Thus, the service provider
can learn the result of location matching, but has no
knowledge about the interested areas of customers and
the locations of mobile users.
• By extending the proxy re-encryption and BBS+ sig-
nature, we protect the sensitive information for mobile
users and customers to prevent privacy leakage, including
their identities, credit points, sensing tasks and sensing
reports. Specifically, we allow the registered customers
and mobile users to anonymously prove their capacities
and trust levels to participate in the crowdsensing services
and securely perform the sensing tasks without exposing
contents of sensing tasks and sensing reports. Besides,
to prevent the mobile users from misbehaving for unfair
rewards, a trusted authority enables to detect the greedy
mobile users and trace their identities.
• We introduce a privacy-preserving credit management
mechanism for mobile users, in which mobile users are
able to prove their trustworthiness without the exposure of
credit points and the management of centralized servers.
In particular, it supports the positive and negative updates
of credit points for mobile users based on the contribu-
tions on the tasks. In addition, multiple service providers
can cooperatively maintain a unique trust evaluation
system, in the way that mobile users are allowed to
participate in the mobile crowdsensing services offered
by different service providers using unique credit points.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
review the related work in section II, and formalize system
model, threat model and identify security goals in section
III. In section IV, we propose our SPOON scheme, followed
by the security discussion in section V. In section VI, we
discuss some extensions on SPOON and evaluate performance
in section VII. Finally, we draw the conclusion in section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Mobile crowdsensing has attracted great interests from the
research community in recent years, especially for security
and privacy aspects. To build a secure mobile crowdsensing
architecture, AnonySense [10] was proposed to allow mobile
devices to deliver sensing data through Mix networks. Christin
et al. [19] investigated the location privacy of mobile users
and presented a decentralized and collaborative mechanism
to allow mobile users to exchange the sensing data when they
physically meet for the protection of the travel routes of mobile
users. Dimitriou et al. [12] raised the problem of customer’s
privacy leakage and designed a privacy-preserving access
control scheme for mobile sensing to preserve the privacy
for customers. However, none of above schemes enables to
preserve the privacy for both mobile users and customers
simultaneously. Therefore, Cristofaro and Soriente [20] pro-
posed a privacy-enhanced participatory sensing infrastructure
(PEPSI) based on the blind extraction technique. In PEPSI, the
identity-based encryption is extended to achieve the anonymity
for both mobile users and customers, and a blind matching
method is built to find the sensing reports for a specific task.
Unfortunately, Gu¨nther et al. [21] demonstrated PEPSI is vul-
nerable to collusion attacks across mobile users and customers.
As a result, PEPSI fails to preserve the privacy of mobile users.
To fix this drawback, a new infrastructure is designed from
anonymous identity-based encryption. Qiu et al. [13] presented
SLICER, a k-anonymous privacy-preserving scheme for mo-
bile sensing that achieves strong privacy preservation for
mobile users and high data quality, by integrating a data coding
technique and message transfer strategies. However, these
schemes may be insufficient to preserve the privacy nowadays,
since it is possible to re-identify the mobile users or customers
through the combination of information from different sources,
3such as travel routes, social relations or payment records.
To protect the sensing data, Zhou et al. [22] introduced a
generalized efficient batch cryptosystem to achieve both batch
encryption and batch decryption from public key encryption,
and extended to support fine-grained multi-receiver multi-file
sharing in cloud-assisted mobile crowdsensing. Chen et al.
[23] introduced a group management protocol to guarantee
differential privacy of personal data to prevent the disclosure
of sensing data. Jin et al. [24] integrated user incentive, data
aggregation and data perturbation mechanisms to design an
incentivizing privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme to
generate high-accurate aggregated results, and provide privacy
protection for mobile users in mobile crowdsensing.
However, after the privacy of mobile users and customers is
preserved, it is difficult for the service provider to find proper
mobile users for task fulfillment. Kazemi and Shahabi [25]
focused on spatial task assignment for spatial crowdsourcing,
in which the service provider allocates tasks based on the
locations of mobile users. To hide their locations, To et
al. [26] introduced a framework to protect the locations of
mobile users based on differential privacy and geocasting. This
framework provides heuristics and optimizations to determine
effective geocast regions for reaching high task assignment
ratio. Kazemi et al. [27] defined reputation scores to represent
the probability that a mobile user can perform a task correctly,
and a confidence level to state that a task is acceptable if
its confidence is higher than a given threshold. Huang et
al. [11] demonstrated that mobile users are vulnerable to
linking attacks if they naively reveal their reputations to the
service provider and presented an anonymization scheme from
pseudonyms and a reputation management mechanism by
employing a trusted server to minimize the risk of such attack.
Christin et al. [28] proposed an identity privacy-preserving
reputation framework, which uses pseudonyms to preserve
the identity privacy for mobile users. The pseudonyms cannot
be linked in multiple time periods, while the reputations can
be transferred for the mobile user that are associated with
adjacent time periods. Consequently, Wang et al. [17] proposed
ARTSense to achieve the trust management without identity
exposure in mobile sensing. ARTSense achieves both positive
and negative updates of reputations for mobile users with
no TTP, but it still requires a reputation database for each
service provider to support reputation management. Moreover,
the reputations of mobile users and the privacy of customers
are directly revealed to the service provider and other curious
entities in ARTSense.
For the above reasons, in our preliminary work [1], we pro-
posed a privacy-preserving mobile crowdsensing framework
to achieve trajectory-based task allocation without privacy
leakage for both mobile users and customers. In this paper, we
extend this work to support privacy-preserving decentralized
credit management in mobile crowdsensing. In specific, the
proposed SPOON (1) provides strong privacy preservation for
mobile users; (2) protects the identities, sensing areas and
tasks for customers; (3) allows the service provider to allocate
sensing tasks based on the locations and credit points of mobile
users; and (4) supports privacy-preserving credit management
without a centralized server. We show the comparison on
Fig. 1. Mobile Crowdsensing Architecture.
features between SPOON and the existing works in Table I.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we formally define the system model and
threat model, and identify our design goals.
A. System model
The mobile crowdsensing service provides customers a
people-centric way for data collection from surrounding envi-
ronment. The architecture consists of three entities: a service
provider, customers and mobile users, as shown in Fig. 1.
Service Providers: Service providers develop cloud ser-
vices by themselves or rent the cloud resources offered by
cloud service providers. They have sufficient storage and
computing resources to provide mobile crowdsensing services.
The service providers receive sensing tasks from customers
and allocate them to mobile users based on their locations.
They collect sensing reports from mobile users, select sensing
reports based on the credit points of mobile users and gen-
erate sensing results for customers. The service provider also
distributes credit points to mobile users for incentive.
Customers: The customers can be individuals, corporations
or organizations. They need to accomplish data collection
tasks, e.g., to study traffic congestion in a city, pollution level
of a creek and satisfactory on public transportation, but they do
not have sufficient capabilities to perform tasks by themselves.
Thereby, they issue their sensing tasks to the service providers
to obtain the sensing results.
Mobile Users: Every mobile user has several mobile de-
vices, e.g., mobile phones, tablets, vehicles and smart glasses.
These mobile devices, with rich computational, communi-
cation and storage resources, are carried by their owners
wherever they go and whatever they do. The mobile users
make sure the battery on mobile devices have sufficient power
to support their normal functions. The mobile users participate
in sensing tasks and utilize their portable devices to collect
data from their surrounding areas to fulfill sensing tasks, and
report sensing data to the service providers for earning credit
points.
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FEATURES COMPARISON ON SPOON AND OTHER WORKS
Features Identity Privacy Data Privacy Location Privacy Credit ManagementUsers Customers Users Customers Users Customers Credit Privacy & Sharing No TTP Greedy user Tracing
SPOON
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
[10], [11]
√
X X X X X X X X
[12] X
√
X
√
X
√
X X X
[13], [25], [28]
√
X
√
X
√
X X X X
[17]
√
X
√
X
√
X X
√ √
[19] X X X X
√
X X X X
[20], [21]
√ √ √
X X X X X X
[22], [23], [24] X X
√
X X X X X X
B. Threat Model
The service provider is responsible for offering mobile
crowdsensing service to customers, but it may strive to in-
crease the income and violate its privacy policy of data
protection. For example, Uber, a crowdsourcing-based ride-
sharing service provider, made ride-booking data publicly ac-
cessible without the permission of customers in January, 2017,
for its own purpose. Therefore, the service provider is not
fully trusted, but honest-but-curious. On one hand, the service
provider would honestly perform the mobile crowdsensing
service; one the other hand, it may learn a spatio-temporal
probability distribution for a specific mobile user and other
sensitive information about customers and mobile users, e.g.,
preference, social relation, political affiliation and purchase
intention, from the maintained information, including sensing
tasks and sensing reports. Moreover, the employees in service
provider may capture and exploit the sensitive information
about mobile users.
Mobile users are interested in the privacy about the cus-
tomers and the other mobile users. In particular, they are
willing to know the other mobile users participating in the
same tasks, and learn more information about customers
they are working for to reach the expectations of customers.
Further, mobile users may be greedy for the credit points,
such that they may anonymously submit more sensing reports
than allowed to warn unfair credit points. In addition, the
mobile users may maliciously forge, modify the sensing data
or deliver ambiguous, biased sensing data to cheat customers
for credit points. These forged or biased data can be discovered
using redundancy or truth discovery approaches. The locations
are extracted from GPS trusted chips in mobile devices or
access points, we assume that mobile users cannot modify
their location information.
The external attackers, such as eavesdroppers and hackers,
also bring serious security threats towards mobile crowd-
sensing services. It is possible for an attacker to obtain the
identities of the nearby mobile users or customers via physical
observation, such that the anonymity may be insufficient for
privacy preservation for customers and mobile users. The cus-
tomers are fully trusted since they are the main beneficiaries
of mobile crowdsensing service.
C. Design Goals
To enable strong privacy-preserving mobile crowdsensing
under the aforementioned system model and against security
threats, SPOON should achieve the following design goals:
• Location-based Task Allocation: The sensing tasks are
allocated to the mobile users in the sensing areas defined
by the customers, and other mobile users out of the given
areas cannot learn any information about the tasks.
• Location Privacy Preservation: The locations of mobile
users and the sensing areas of sensing tasks would not
be exposed to others. The mobile users are only aware
whether they are in the sensing area or not.
• Data Confidentiality: No entity, except the delegated
participants, can obtain the content of releasing tasks or
sensing reports, such that the privacy of customers and
mobile users would not be disclosed to others.
• Anonymity of Mobile Users and Customers: The
customers, mobile users, the service provider or their
collusion are unable to link a sensing report to a mobile
user or link a sensing task to a customer. It is even
impossible for an attacker to identify whether two sensing
reports are generated by the same mobile user or two
sensing tasks are issued by the same customer.
• Privacy-Preserving Credit Management: Credit points
are used to represent the reputation of mobile users and
encourage them to participate in the mobile crowdsensing
activities as rewards. The service provider selects the
sensing reports based on the credit points of mobile
users and awards credit points to mobile users without
knowing the exact credit points of mobile users. The
balance of credit points is achieved, which means that it
is impossible for the mobile users to forge credit points
without being detected, such that the total credit points
of a mobile user should be equal to the awarded credit
points plus the initial points.
• Greedy User Tracing: The identities of greedy mobile
users, who submit more than one sensing report for the
same task in a reporting period, are recovered to prevent
the mobile user from awarding unfair credit points.
IV. THE SPOON SCHEME
In this section, we review the preliminaries and propose
our SPOON, which is composed of five phases, Service Setup,
User Registration, Task Allocation, Data Reporting and Credit
Assignment, based on the matrix multiplication, the BBS+
signature [29] and the proxy re-encryption [30].
5A. Preliminaries
We review the preliminaries that are used to design our
SPOON, including the bilinear map, the BBS+ signature and
the proxy re-encryption.
Bilinear Map. Let (G,GT ) be two cyclic groups with a
prime order p. eˆ : G×G→ GT is the bilinear map with the
following properties:
• Bilinearity. For g ∈ G, a, b ∈ Zp, eˆ(ga, gb) = eˆ(g, g)ab.
• Non-degeneracy. For g 6= 1G, eˆ(g, g) 6= 1GT .
• Computability. eˆ is efficiently computable.
• (Unique Representation). The binary presentation for all
elements in G,GT is unique.
BBS+ Signature [29]. Here we briefly review the BBS+
signature due to [29], which can be utilized to sign `-message
vector (m1, · · · ,m`).
Let g, g1, · · · , g`+1 be generators of G. Randomly choose
x from Zp as the secret key of the signature scheme, and
compute the corresponding public key as y = gx.
A signature on messages (m1, · · · ,m`) is (A, e, s), where
A = (ggm11 · · · gm`` gs`+1)
1
x+e and (e, s) are random values
chosen from Zp.
This signature can be checked as: eˆ(ggm11 · · · gm`` gs`+1, g)
?
=
eˆ(A, yge).
The security of BBS+ signature can be reduced to the
q-SDH assumption and it can be utilized to construct a
zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge protocol that allows the
signer to prove the possession of the message-signature pair.
Proxy Re-Encryption [30]. Proxy Re-encryption is a spe-
cial public key encryption with a desirable property that a
semi-trusted proxy enables to convert a ciphertext for Al-
ice into a ciphertext for Bob without seeing the underlying
plaintext, given a proxy re-encryption key. Thanks to this
promising property, it has been widely employed in data
sharing scenarios. The proxy re-encryption scheme is proposed
by Ateniese et al. [30], the details of which are as follows:
• KeyGen(·). Alice picks a random value a ∈ Zp as the
secret key ska and compute the public key pka = ga.
• RKeyGen(ska, pkb). Alice delegates to Bob by sending
the re-encryption key rkA→B = gb/a to a proxy by using
Bob’s public key.
• Encrypt(m, pka). To encrypt a message m ∈ GT under
pka, Alice chooses a random value k ∈ Zp to compute
ca = (g
ak,meˆ(g, g)k).
• Re-Enc(ca, rkA→B). The proxy can change the ciphertext
ca into a ciphertext cb for Bob with rkA→B . From ca,
the proxy calculates eˆ(gak, gb/a) = eˆ(g, g)bk and releases
cb = (eˆ(g, g)
bk,meˆ(g, g)k).
• Decrypt (cb, skb). Bob enables to decrypt cb to obtain m
as m = meˆ(g, g)k/(eˆ(g, g)bk)1/b.
B. High-Level Description
We first provide a high-level description of SPOON and
its information flow, which is shown in Fig. 2. The notions
frequently used in SPOON are listed in Table II.
Service Setup: A trusted authority (TA) bootstraps
the whole mobile crowdsensing service for the
TABLE II
FREQUENTLY USED NOTIONS
Ui{i∈R} Set of registered mobile users
Ui{i∈L} Set of mobile users in sensing area L
ST A task issued by a customer
task The detailed content of a task ST
expires The expiration time of a task ST
area The sensing region of a task ST
Lm×n A matrix to represent the service area of the service provider
L̂m×n A matrix to represent the sensing area of a task ST
L˜m×n A matrix to represent the current and future locations of a user
M̂m×n A random invertible matrix
M˜m×n A random invertible matrix
I The unique identity of a registrant (mobile user or customer)
P0 The initial credit point of a mobile user
 The trust level of a sensing report
γ The maximum of trust level in a task ST
Q The credit threshold chosen by a mobile user
A, e, s The anonymous credential of a mobile user or customer
B, f, t The anonymous credential of a mobile user with credit point P
service provider by defining the public parameters
(G,GT , p, g, g0, g1, g2, g3, h, h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, G,H,G,H,F)
and generates its secret-public key pair (α, T ). The service
provider also generates the secret-public key pair (β, S), and
defines a matrix Lm×n to denote the geographic region of its
crowdsensing service.
User Registration: The TA registers the mobile users
and customers, who are willing to participate in the mobile
crowdsensing service. It evaluates the registrant to determine
the initial credit point P0 and interacts with the registrant to
generate an anonymous credential (A, e, s, B, f, t). (A, e, s) is
used to access the mobile crowdsensing service and (B, f, t)
is used to credit management for the registrant. To achieve
the anonymity, the ownership of (A, e, s) and (B, f, t) is
proved by the registrant for identity authentication and credit
evaluation using zero-knowledge proofs, respectively. Besides,
RK is assigned to the registrant for the decryption of allocated
sensing tasks.
Task Allocation: A customer generates a sensing task ST
and sends the message (c1, c2, c3, expires, N̂n×n, γ, w,PK2)
to the service provider, which consists of the encrypted task
(c1, c2, c3), the expiration time expires, the randomized sens-
ing area N̂n×n, the identity proof PK2 and other information.
The latter releases (num, expires, γ) to attract mobile users
for participation, where num is the identifier of ST . A mobile
user Ui{i∈R} sends its location N˜n×n and identity proof PK3
to the service provider. Then, the service provider finds the
set of mobile users Ui{i∈L} in the sensing area of ST based
on two matrices (N̂n×n, N˜n×n). Since (N̂n×n, N˜n×n) are ran-
domized matrices, the service provider can learn whether Ui is
in the sensing area of ST based on matrix multiplication, but
has no information about ST ’s sensing area and Ui’s location.
The service provider re-encrypts the ciphertext (c1, c2, c3)
to be decryptable for Ui{i∈L} using β. Finally, the service
provider sends (num, c2, c3, c4, expires, γ, w) to Ui{i∈L}.
Data Reporting: Ui{i∈L} encrypts the collected data
mi to generate (Di, D′i), and sends the sensing re-
port (num,Di, D′i, C
′
i, Xi, Yi, Zi, Qi, τj ,SPK) to the service
provider, in which C ′i is the commitment on the identity Ii
6Fig. 2. Information Flow of Mobile Crowdsensing.
and credit point Pi, Xi is the identifier of this report, Yi
is the identifier of Ui, Zi is a tag to identify the double-
reporting user, Qi is the claimed credit threshold to show
that the number of credit points Ui has is larger than Qi,
τj is the current slot for reporting, and SPK is used to prove
the ownership of its credit points Pi. The service provider
selects w−sensing reports based on the claimed thresholds
and forwards the selected reports to the customer. The TA can
recover the identity of anonymous mobile user who double-
reports sensing reports with the service provider using the
double-reporting tag Zi.
Credit Assignment: The customer evaluates the trustwor-
thiness of each report and returns the corresponding trust level
i ∈ [−γ, γ] to the service provider. The latter computes
the number of credit points awarded to Ui, θi, and forwards
(Bi, t
′′
i , fi, θi, Yi) to Ui, where (Bi, t
′′
i , fi) is the ticket for
awarded credit points θi, and Yi is used to identify the mobile
user Ui. Once receiving (Bi, t′′i , fi, θi, Yi), Ui updates its credit
points P ′i = Pi+ θi and the anonymous credential (Bi, fi, ti)
for the new P ′i .
C. The Detailed SPOON
We then show the detailed SPOON as follows.
1) Service Setup: Let (G,GT ) be two cyclic
groups with a prime order p, where p is λ bits, and
eˆ : G × G → GT be a bilinear map. The authority picks
random generators g, g0, g1, g2, g3, h, h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 ∈ G
and computes G = eˆ(g, g) and H = eˆ(h, h)
respectively. The TA also chooses a random value
G ∈ GT and defines a cryptographic hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and a pseudo-random function
F : Zp × {0, 1}∗ → Zp. The public parameters param are
(G,GT , p, g, g0, g1, g2, g3, h, h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, G,H,G,H,F).
The TA randomly chooses α ∈ Zp as its secret key and
calculates the public key T = gα.
To setup the mobile crowdsensing service, the service
provider randomly chooses its secret key β ∈ Zp and computes
S = hβ as its public key. It also employs a matrix Lm×n to
denote the geographical region that the crowdsensing service
can cover according to the longitude and latitude. Each entry in
the matrix denotes a small grid in the sensing region, as shown
in Fig. 3. Assume the longitude of Ontario is from 74.40◦W
to 95.15◦W, the latitude is from 41.66◦N to 57.00◦N, we can
use a 208× 154 matrix or 2075× 1534 matrix more precisely
to represent the Ontario region.
2) User Registration: Either customer or mobile user
is required to register at the TA to obtain an anonymous
credential, which is used to participate in the crowdsensing
service. Each registrant is assigned a unique identity I in
the system, which can be the telephone number or mailing
address in practise. The registrant picks three random values
s′, a, t′ ∈ Zp to compute C = gs′1 ga2 , C ′ = ht
′
1 h
a
2 , Â = g
a,
and sends (I, C,C ′, Â) to the TA, along with the following
zero-knowledge proof:
PK1{(s′, t′, a) : C = gs′1 ga2 ∧ C ′ = ht
′
1 h
a
2 ∧ Â = ga}.
The TA firstly checks the proof PK1 for ensuring that
(C,C ′, Â) are generated correctly. Then, it evaluates the
registrant’s initial credit point according to its credit record,
which is assumed to be P0. After that, the TA randomly
picks s′′, e, t′′, f ∈ Zp to calculate A = (g0Cgs′′1 gI3)
1
α+e ,
B = (h0C
′ht
′′
1 h
I
3h
P0
4 )
1
α+f , RK = Â
1
α , and returns
(A,B, s′′, t′′, e, f, P0, RK) to the registrant through secure
channels. Finally, the TA stores the tuple (I, P0, Â) in its
database.
The registrant computes s = s′+ s′′, t = t′+ t′′ and checks
eˆ(A, Tge)
?
= eˆ(g0g
s
1g
a
2g
I
3 , g),
eˆ(B, Thf )
?
= eˆ(h0h
t
1h
a
2h
I
3h
P0
4 , h).
The registrant stores (A, e, s, B, f, t, a, I, P0, Â, RK) secretly
on the read-only memory of mobile device.
3) Task Allocation: A customer with registered informa-
tion (A, e, s, B, f, t, a, I, P0, Â, RK) has a sensing task to be
allocated to mobile users and requests the sensing data slot by
slot, where each slot ranges from minutes to days depending
on the specific requirements of the sensing task. The statement
of the task is defined as ST = (task, expires, area, γ, w),
which indicate the content (what to sense), the expiration
time (when to sense), the sensing area (where to sense), the
maximum trust level and the number of required reports, re-
spectively. Other attributes (e.g., sensing intervals, acceptance
conditions, benefits, reporting periods) can be illustrated in
task. To protect the content of the task, the customer randomly
picks k, r1, r2, r3 ∈ Zp to calculate u = gk, c1 = Sr2 ,
c2 = T
r1 and c3 = (task||u)Gr1Hr2 . Then, the customer
generates a matrix L̂m×n to indicate the target sensing re-
gion area. As depicted in Fig. 3, for each position in the
sensing area, the corresponding entry in L̂m×n is set to
be a random value chosen from Z∗p, and the value for a
location outside is set to be zero. To mask the sensing area
in L̂m×n, the customer picks m × n random numbers from
Z∗p to generate an invertible matrix M̂m×n and computes
N̂n×n = L̂Tm×n · M̂m×n, where L̂Tm×n is the transpose of the
matrix L̂m×n. Note that all non-zero entries in L̂m×n should
be distinct, unless an attacker still can learn the sensing region
from N̂n×n. Finally, the customer keeps k in private and sends
(c1, c2, c3, expires, N̂n×n, γ, w) to the service provider, along
with the following zero-knowledge proof:
PK2{(A, e, s, a, I) : eˆ(A, Tge)=eˆ(g0gs1ga2gI3 , g)}.
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The service provider checks the validity of the
proof PK2. If yes, it assigns a task identifier
num, releases (num, expires, γ) and stores
(num, c1, c2, c3, expires, N̂n×n, γ, w) in its database.
When a mobile user Ui{i∈R} with (Ai, ei, si, Bi, fi,
ti, ai, Ii, Pi, Âi, RKi) is willing to participate in crowdsensing
activities, it firstly picks a random value ν ∈ Zp to calculate
µ = hν . Then, Ui generates a matrix L˜m×n according to its
current location and the places it will visit. For each location
Ui will reach, the corresponding entry in L˜m×n is set to be a
random value chosen from Z∗p, and the rest entries are set to
be zero. The non-zero entries in L˜m×n should be different. To
protect these location information, it also generates a random
invertible matrix M˜m×n by picking m× n random values
from Z∗p, and calculates N˜n×n = M˜Tm×n · L˜m×n. Finally, Ui
keeps ν secretly and sends (µ, N˜n×n) to the service provider,
along with the following zero-knowledge proof:
PK3{(Ai, ei, si, ai, Ii) : eˆ(Ai, T gei)=eˆ(g0gsi1 gai2 gIi3 , g)}.
The service provider returns failure if PK3 is invalid.
Otherwise, for each unexpired task, it uses N̂n×n to calculate
Nn×n = N˜n×n · N̂n×n and checks whether Nn×n is zero ma-
trix or not. If Nn×n is non-zero matrix, which means that Ui
can match ST , the service provider calculates c4 = eˆ(µ, c1)
1
β
and releases (num, c2, c3, c4, expires, γ, w) for Ui. If there is
no task to match Ui, the service provider responds failure.
When Ui obtains (num, c2, c3, c4, expires, γ, w), it
decrypts (c2, c3, c4) by using (ν, ai) as task||u =
c3c
− 1ν
4 eˆ(c2, RKi)
− 1ai . Then, Ui evaluates the task and
determines to participate in or abandon this task according
to benefit and cost. If Ui accepts the task ST , it starts to
perform the sensing work according to the details in task.
The correctness of task||u is elaborated as follows:
c3c
− 1ν
4 eˆ(c2, RKi)
− 1ai (1)
= c3eˆ(µ, c1)
− 1βν eˆ(c2, RKi)
− 1ai
= (task||u)Gr1Hr2 eˆ(hν , Sr2)− 1βν eˆ(T r1 , g aiα )− 1ai
= (task||u)Gr1Hr2H−r2G−r1
= task||u.
4) Data Reporting: Ui collects and, pre-processes the data
mi ∈ GT and submits a sensing report to the customer
periodically, which includes the collection time, the sensing
location and the detailed content. The reporting periods are
defined by the customer, and we assume the current slot
is τj . To prevent attackers from learning mi, Ui uses u to
encrypt mi as Di = urˆi , D′i = miG
rˆi , where rˆi is a
value randomly chosen from Zp. Then, Ui randomly picks
t′i ∈ Zp to compute C ′i = ht
′
i
1 h
ai
2 h
Ii
3 h
Pi
4 . Next, Ui computes
Xi = H(num||mi||τj), vi = Fai(num||I||τj), Yi = Hvi and
Zi = eˆ(g, Âi)GXivi . Finally, Ui chooses a credit threshold Qi
and sends the report (num,Di, D′i, C
′
i, Xi, Yi, Zi, Qi, τj) to
the service provider, along with the following zero-knowledge
proof:
SPK

(Bi, fi, ti, t
′
i, ai, Ii, Pi, vi) :
eˆ(Bi, Th
fi)=eˆ(h0h
ti
1 h
ai
2 h
Ii
3 h
Pi
4 , h)∧
C ′i = h
t′i
1 h
ai
2 h
Ii
3 h
Pi
4 ∧
Pi > Qi∧
Yi = H
vi∧
Zi = eˆ(g, Âi)GXivi

(num).
The service provider returns failure if SPK is invalid;
otherwise, the service provider checks whether there is an-
other report (num, D˜i, D˜′i, C˜
′
i, X˜i, Yi, Z˜i, Q˜i) that has the
same Yi and different X˜i with the new received report
(num,Di, D
′
i, C
′
i, Xi, Yi, Zi, Qi). If yes, the service provider
computes and sends W = ( Z˜
Xi
i
Z
X˜i
i
)
1
Xi−X˜i to the TA, and the TA
can find the mobile user’s identity Ii by utilizing Âi in the
database to check W = eˆ(g, Âi). Such that, the identity of the
greedy mobile user is recovered by the TA if it submits two
different sensing reports in a reporting slot. Then, according to
the claimed thresholds, the service provider chooses w reports
that have top-w thresholds, and releases them for the customer.
Note that the mobile users, whose reports are not selected, can
increase their thresholds in the next reporting slot τj + 1.
When the customer retrieves the reports, it can decrypt them
using the stored k as mi = D′ieˆ(g,Di)
1
k one by one.
5) Credit Assignment: After the customer obtains the
sensing result, it evaluates the trustworthiness of each report
and responds the corresponding trust level to the service
provider. The trust level of mi is defined as i ∈ [−γ, γ]. If
i is positive, mi is trustworthy, otherwise, mi is incredible.
Upon receiving trust levels, the service provider randomly
picks t′′i , fi ∈ Zp to compute θi = INT (iQi), Bi =
(h0h
t′′i
1 C
′
ih
θi
4 )
1
β+fi , and releases (Bi, t′′i , fi, θi, Yi) for Ui,
where INT (x) is the nearest integer function.
Ui retrieves (Bi, t′′i , fi, θi, Yi) from the service provider,
computes ti = t′i + t
′′
i , P
′
i = Pi + θi and checks whether
eˆ(Bi, Sh
fi)=eˆ(h0h
ti
1 h
ai
2 h
Ii
3 h
P ′i
4 , h) or not. If yes, Ui uses the
new tuple (Bi, fi, ti, P ′i ) to replace the previous one and stores
them together with (Ai, ei, si, ai, Ti, Âi, RKi). Meanwhile, Ui
updates P ′i in the read-only memory, which can be used to
show the credit points in the future crowdsensing activities.
Further, since (Bi, fi, ti, P ′i ) are managed by Ui, Ui enables
to prove the ownership of (Bi, fi, ti) cross service providers.
The credit points awarded by different service providers can
be accumulated and Ui can prove the credit points to multiple
service providers during the participation of mobile crowd-
sensing services offered by different service providers.
V. SECURITY DISCUSSION
In this section, we show that SPOON satisfies five secu-
rity goals defined in III-C: location privacy, anonymity, data
8confidentiality, credit balance and greedy user tracing.
A. Location Privacy
The sensing region of a task is represented as a matrix
L̂m×n, which is randomized by a random matrix M̂m×n to
generate N̂n×n. The location of the mobile user is trans-
formed to be N˜n×n. Having two matrices N̂n×n and N˜n×n,
the service provider cannot learn any information about the
location of the mobile user and the sensing area of the task.
The service provider computes Nn×n = N̂n×n · N˜n×n. If
there is no overlapping between the sensing area of task and
the location of mobile user, Nn×n must be zero matrix. If
one overlapping grid exists, whose corresponding entry is L̂ij
in L̂m×n and is L˜ij in L˜m×n, respectively, the entries in j-
row of N̂n×n are nonzero, as well as the entries in j-column
of N˜n×n. Thus, the service provider enables to know that
there are some overlapping locations on the j-column of the
sensing area, while it is unable to distinguish which location
is overlapped from m locations. Further, N̂n×n · N˜n×n and
N˜n×n · N̂n×n cannot give more information to the service
provider. The results are the same if the overlapping grids are
more than one. Therefore, the sensing area and the location
of mobile user would not be exposed to the service provider
and other entities.
B. Data Confidentiality
We aim to ensure that only the mobile users whose locations
can match the sensing area have the capacity to recover the
corresponding sensing task. In SPOON, the adversaries may
be the service provider, unmatched mobile users and exter-
nal attackers. To resist these adversaries, the task protection
consists of two stages. In the first stage, the sensing task is
encrypted by the customer under the public keys of the TA and
the service provider; in the second one, the service provider
partially decrypts the ciphertext using its secret key and then
re-encrypts the result for the matched mobile users. Therefore,
we demonstrate the task confidentiality in the following two
procedures:
• Firstly, the first-stage ciphertext should not be entirely
decryptable for the service provider or the mobile users.
To be specific, given the first-stage ciphertext (c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3)
and two plaintexts (task1||u1, task2||u2), if an adversary
can distinguish which one out of (task1||u1, task2||u2)
is the plaintext of (c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3), we show how to construct
a simulator S to solve the q−DBDHI problem [30].
Given the simplified q−DBDHI tuple g, T1 = gz1 , T2 =
gz2 ∈ G, Q ∈ GT , the simulator S’s goal is to de-
termine whether Q = eˆ(g, g)
z1
z2 via interactions with
the adversary. S sets T = T1. The adversary pos-
sessing the secret key of the service provider, β, can
query any chosen message task||u to the simulator S
to obtain the corresponding the ciphertext. Then, S picks
two messages (task1||u1, task2||u2) and a random bit
b ∈ {0, 1} to compute the challenge (c∗1, c∗2, c∗3) =
(Sr2 , T2, (taskb||ub)QHr2), where r2 is a random value
chosen from Zp, and returns (task1||u1, task2||u2) to the
adversary, along with (c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3). Finally, the adversary
returns bˆ ∈ {0, 1} to S. If bˆ = b, S can address the sim-
plified q−DBDHI problem as Q ?= c∗3
(taskb||ub)eˆ(c∗1 ,h)
− 1
β
.
The task confidentiality against the adversary, who pos-
sesses α, also relies on the simplified q−DBDHI problem,
given h, T1 = hz1 , T2 = hz2 ∈ G, Q ∈ GT , The proof
is the same as that above with one difference that the
challenge is (c∗1 = T2, c
∗
2 = T
r1
1 , c
∗
3 = (taskb||ub)QGr1),
where r1 is a random value chosen from Zp. Finally,
S can address the simplified q−DBDHI problem as
Q
?
=
c∗3
(taskb||ub)eˆ(c∗2 ,g)−
1
α
.
• Secondly, the sensing task should only be recovered by
the matched mobile users from the second-stage cipher-
text. To prevent unmatched mobile users from learning
the content of sensing task, the service provider encrypts
the sensing task with the temporary public key µ using the
proxy re-encryption scheme [30]. Therefore, the security
of the second-stage ciphertext can be reduced to the
q−DBDHI assumption as well.
To guarantee the confidentiality of sensing reports, each
mobile user employs the proxy re-encryption scheme [30] to
encrypt mi under the temporary public key u = gk, which is
distributed to the mobile users along with the sensing task. The
decryption key k is kept by the customer secretly. Therefore,
the confidentiality of mi directly depends on the sematic
security of proxy re-encryption scheme, which can be reduced
to the simplified q−DBDHI assumption [30].
C. Anonymity
The anonymity of the mobile user is defined via the game
in which the adversary cannot distinguish an honest mobile
user out of two under the extreme condition that all other
interactions are specified by the adversary. We prove that the
mobile user’s identity is preserved properly, unless the DDH
assumption [31] does not hold. Specifically, if there exists an
adversary A that can identify an honest mobile user out of two
challenging identities, we show how to construct a simulator
S to solve an instance of the DDH problem. That is, given a
tuple T1, T2, T3, T4 ∈ GT , S can tell whether exists (z1, z2),
such that T2 = T z11 , T3 = T
z2
1 , T4 = T
z1z2
1 . S generates
(param, S, T ), picks two identities (I0, ga0), (I1, ga1), where
a0, a1 ∈ Zp, and sends them to A. S acts on behalf of the
users I0 and I1 to register at the TA. S then interacts with A
in the following interactions:
• S acts as I0 honestly to submit the location information.
For I1, in the j-th query, S randomly chooses µj ∈ G
and simulates the zero-knowledge proof PK3 to prove its
identity interacting with A.
• S honestly acts on behalf of I0 to report the data. For
I1, S sets H = T1, G = T2. For the j-th query, S
randomly chooses Xj , vj ∈ Zp and computes Yj = T vj1 ,
Zj = eˆ(g, g
a1)T
Xjvj
2 . S simulates the zero-knowledge
proof SPK and sends (Xj , Yj , Zj ,SPK) to A, along
with a random sensing report.
S picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 0, S honestly reports
the data acts as I0. If b = 1 and S randomly chooses X1 ∈ Zp
9and calculates G = T2, Y1 = T3, Z1 = eˆ(g, ga1)TX14 . Then,
S simulates SPK and a sensing report, and sends them to A.
It is easy to see that the simulation is perfect if logT1T4 =
logT1T2logT1T3; otherwise, it contains no information about
I0 and I1.
Finally, A returns bˆ. If bˆ = b, S can confirm that there exists
(z1, z2), such that T2 = T z11 , T3 = T
z2
1 , T4 = T
z1z2
1 . Thus, S
resolves the DDH problem.
In the proof of customer’s anonymity, a simulator S sim-
ulates the transcript of the zero-knowledge proof of the sig-
nature (A, e, s), PK2, to interact with the adversary A. Since
S can perfectly simulates PK2, the adversary cannot obtain
any identity information about the customer, such that it is
impossible to distinguish an honest customer from two for A.
Therefore, the customer’s anonymity can be fully guaranteed.
D. Credit Balance
Credit balance means that no one can own the credit points
more than the initial credit points plus the credit points
awarded by service providers. This is the most significant
requirement for credit management from the respective of
security. Assume P0 be the initial credit points and θj be the
earned points from the service provider in the j-th query. If
the adversary A at most makes Rˆ reporting queries, and owns
final credit points Pf , where Pf > P0+
∑Rˆ
j=1 θj , while service
providers do not identify the double-reporting, there must exist
a simulator S to conduct a forgery attack on the underlying
BBS+ signature [29].
Firstly, we assume that the zero-knowledge proofs PK1,
PK2, PK3 and SPK are sound. That is, there exist extract
algorithms EX 1, EX 2, EX 3 and EXS to obtain the witnesses
of the zero-knowledge proofs, respectively.
Then, we show the simulator S that interacts with A.
S generates the public parameters param, the public keys
(T, S) and the secret keys (α, β), and is allowed to access the
signature oracle SO to get the BBS+ signature of an input. S
sends (param, S, T ) to A and interacts with A as follows:
• A randomly chooses C,C ′, Â ∈ G, and generates the
proof PK1 and sends them to S. S extracts the witness
(s′, t′, a) from PK1 using EX 1, and then picks a random
credit point P0 and queries the signature oracle SO
to obtain (A, e, s) and (B, f, t). Finally, S calculates
s′′ = s − s′, t′′ = t − t′ and RK = Â 1α , and returns
(A, e, s′′, B, f, t′′, P0, RK) to A.
• For the j-th query, A picks a random C ′j ∈ G and
executes SPK with S. S utilizes EXS to extract the wit-
ness (Bj , fj , tj , t′j , aj , Ij , Pj , vj). If (Bj , fj , tj) is not an
output of SO, it is a forgery of the BBS+ signature. Oth-
erwise, S queries SO to obtain a signature (Bj , fj , tj)
on input (aj , Pj + θj , Ij). S receives (Bj , fj , tj) and
computes t′′j = tj − t′j , and returns (Bj , fj , t′′j ) to A.
Finally, assume A executes Rˆ queries. A wins the game if
it can prove Pf > P0 +
∑Rˆ
j=1 θj . However, if Pf > P0 +∑Rˆ
j=1 θj , A must have conducted a forged BBS+ signautre or
double-reported the data. While the BBS+ signature is secure
under the q−SDH assumption [29], A cannot forge a BBS+
signature, unless the q−SDH assumption [29] does not hold.
If A double-reports the sensing data, it must generate another
Z˜i, which is unequal to the previous Zi, in the same time
slot. Due to the soundness of zero-knowledge proof protocol,
Zi = eˆ(g, Âi)GXivi is the only valid Zi to accompany the
specific report identified by Xi and Yi. Since Xi should be
different for two reports, eˆ(g, Âi) would be obtained as long as
the proof is valid. We assume the proof SPK is sound. Thus,
the success probability of double-reporting for A is negligible.
Therefore, the probability to obtain Pf > P0 +
∑Rˆ
j=1 θj is
negligible if the q−SDH assumption holds.
E. Greedy User Tracing
Greedy user tracing consists of two objectives, namely,
slandering and hiding. Slandering means that an attacker
cannot slander an honest mobile user, and hiding means that a
greedy user must be identified by the TA. For the slandering,
the attacker releases pieces of reporting transcripts that can
link to other reports submitted by an honest mobile user. It is
infeasible for the attacker to compute the tracing information
about an honest mobile user since the proof SPK is sound.
Therefore, no attacker enables to slander an honest mobile
user. In terms of the hiding, the attacker is required to generate
different pieces of tracing information without being traced.
However, it is impossible for a greedy mobile user to compute
Zi if the pseudo-random function F is correct.
VI. EXTENSION
In this section, we propose an approach to evaluate the
trust levels of sensing reports and a new location matching
mechanism to achieve communication-efficient task allocation
for mobile crowdsensing.
A. Evaluation on Trust Level
The service provider uploads w sensing reports to the cus-
tomer, and the customer evaluates the trust level of each report,
and distributes credit points to mobile users. Sensing reports
have distinct trustworthiness due to the various intelligence
of data sources. Furthermore, some mobile users may forge
the sensing data or deliver ambiguous, biased data to gain
credit points by cheating. Therefore, we propose a fair trust
evaluation mechanism as follows:
• The customer generates the weights of sensing data asso-
ciated with grids in the sensing region ωz{z∈L} ∈ (0, 1],
such that
∑
{z∈L} ωz = 1, and divides w sensing reports
into |L| groups, where |L| means the number of the grids
in the sensing area. If the data in a sensing report are
collected from several grids, this report is in the groups
associated with these grids meanwhile.
• For each sensing report in a group z ∈ L, the customer
computes the similarity Vi,z . If a sensing report is signifi-
cantly different from the others in the same group (e.g., an
opposite result), its similarity is set to be a negative value
Vi,z ∈ [−γ, 0]. Otherwise, the customer sets a positive
similarity Vi,z ∈ (0, γ] for the report.
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• For each sensing report in a group z ∈ L, the customer
computes ρi,z = Vi,zQi and Expz =
∑
i∈Z ρi,z , where
Z denotes the set of the sensing reports in the group
z. Then, the customer sets the trust level of the sensing
report to be i,z = (
ρi,z
Expz
)ωzγ.
• If the report only contains the data collected from one
grid, its trust level is i = i,z; otherwise, the trust level
is set to be the average of the trust levels for all the grids
where mi is collected as i = AV Ez(i,z).
B. Efficiency-enhanced Task Allocation
In SPOON, we use the matrices L̂m×n and L˜m×n to repre-
sent the sensing area of the task and the location of the mobile
user, respectively. To prevent attackers from acquiring the
location information, M̂m×n, M˜m×n are exploited to random-
ize L̂m×n, L˜m×n. Although this approach is computationally
efficient and the service provider cannot identify the exact
region, the service provider has to define its service region in
service setup phase and the communication overhead in task
allocation phase is a little heavy, since both the customer and
the mobile user are required to transmit the matrices N̂n×n,
N˜n×n to the service provider. To reduce the communication
cost, we propose a communication-efficient location matching
mechanism by employing the BGN encryption [32].
In the service setup phase, apart from generating param
and the secret-public key pair (α, T ), the TA setups the BGN
encryption. It chooses two random λ-bit primes q1, q2, sets
n = q1q2, and generates two bilinear groups G1,G2 of order
n that satisfies the bilinear map e˜ : G1 × G1 → G2. It also
picks a random generator l ∈ G1 to compute l1 = lq2 . Thus,
the public key of the TA is (n,G1,G2, l, l1, T ) and the secret
key is (α, q1).
When a customer with (A, e, s, B, f, t, a, I, P, Â, RK) has
a sensing task ST = (task, expires, area, γ, w) to be al-
located to the mobile users, it generates (c1, c2, c3, u,PK2),
following the steps given in IV. C. The sensing area area
is defined as a circle, which is uniquely identified by a
center Lc = (Lcx, Lcy) and a radius R, where Lcx is
the longitude and Lcy is the latitude. As shown in Fig. 4,
assume the geographical location of a mobile user U1 is
Lu1 . If the distance between Lu1 and Lc is shorter than
R, U1 is located in the sensing area; otherwise, it is out
of the crowdsensing region. To protect the sensing region,
the customer picks three random values r′x, r
′
y, r
′
r ∈ Zn and
computes Cx = lLcx l
r′x
1 , Cy = l
Lcy l
r′y
1 , and CR = l
Rl
r′r
1 . The
customer sends (c1, c2, c3, expires,PK2, Cx, Cy, CR, γ, w) to
the service provider and the latter releases the task ST as
described in IV. C.
If a mobile user Ui wants to perform sensing tasks, it
chooses a random ν ∈ Zp to compute µ = hν . Then, Ui
retrieves the location information Lui = (Lix, Liy) from the
GPS device or the access point, and encrypts it using the public
key of the TA as follows: pick random values r′′x , r
′′
y ∈ Zn to
calculate Ux = lLix l
r′′x
1 , Uy = l
Liy l
r′′y
1 . Finally, Ui generates
PK3 and sends (µ,Ux, Uy,PK3) to the service provider.
Upon receiving (µ,Ux, Uy,PK3), the service provider
firstly determines whether a sensing task’s sensing region cov-
ers the location of this user. For each unexpired task, the ser-
vice provider computes X ′ = e˜(CxUx ,
Cx
Ux
), Y ′ = e˜(CyUy ,
Cy
Uy
) and
Z ′ = X ′Y ′, and sends Z ′ to the TA, along with (CR, num)
for every task. The TA decrypts Z ′ and CR to recover di and
R, respectively, and checks whether di < R to find the set of
matching sensing tasks, and returns the task numbers num to
the service provider. Then, the service provider generates c4
and releases (num, c2, c3, c4, expires, γ) for Ui. Finally, Ui
obtains the sensing task and collects data.
This location matching mechanism is built from the BGN
encryption and the homomorphic property is utilized to com-
pute the distance from the circle center to the location of
mobile users. The security of this mechanism can be reduced
to the sematic security of the BGN encryption scheme. More-
over, the customer is required to send (Cx, Cy, CR) and the
mobile user is needed to deliver (Ux, Uy) to the operation
center, which are shorter than N̂n×n and N˜n×n
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our SPOON
in terms of computational and communication overheads, and
analyze privacy rate and accuracy rate for credit management.
A. Computational Overhead
We demonstrate the computational overhead of our SPOON
by counting the number of the time-consuming cryptographic
operations, such as point multiplication, point addition, bilin-
ear map and exponentiation in GT . Here we only show four
kinds of operations because other operations, e.g., multiplica-
tion in GT , addition, multiplication and inverse operations in
Zp, are not comparable with these four operations. Besides,
since the bilinear map is the most time-consuming operation
in cryptographic calculations, we utilize the pre-processing
technique to reduce the computational burden for each en-
tity. Specifically, the TA pre-computes the bilinear maps
{Ei}4i=0, {Fi}4i=0,K,K ′0, {Ki}3i=0 in service setup phase as
shown in Appendix A, and the bilinear maps {eˆ(g, Âi)}Ni=0 in
user registration phase, where N is the number of registrants.
The mobile user Ui also can pre-compute eˆ(g, Âi) in user reg-
istration phase. Table III shows the number of the operations
executed by each entity in each phase of SPOON, respectively.
We also conduct an experiment to show the efficiency
of SPOON. The operations of TA and service provider are
11
TABLE III
COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD OF SPOON
Phase User Registration Task Allocation Data Reporting Credit AssignmentAuthority User Customer Provider User Customer Provider User Provider User
Point Multiplication 16 19 11 12 9 0 19 25 3 5
Point Addition 12 13 5 8 5 0 14 16 3 5
Bilinear Map 0 4 1 1 2 1 5 2 0 2
Exponentiation in GT 0 0 6 15 8 1 19 15 0 0
Running Time (ms) 83.429 293.372 100.123 138.529 154.980 56.415 197.324 203.129 15.643 130.448
performed on a notebook with Intel Core i5-4200U CPU,
the clock rate is 2.29GHz and the memory is 4.00 GB.
The operations of customers and mobile users are run on
HUAWEI MT2-L01 smartphone with Kirin 910 CPU and
1250M memory. The operation system is Android 4.2.2 and
the toolset is Android NDK r8d. We use MIRACL library
5.6.1 to implement number-theoretic based methods of cryp-
tography. The Weil pairing is utilized to realize the bilinear
pairing. The parameter p is approximately 160 bits and the
elliptic curve is defined as y = x3 + 1 over Fq , where q is
512 bits. The execution time of each entity in every phase
of SPOON is shown in Table III. The running time is less
than 300 ms for each entity. Therefore, our SPOON is quite
efficient to be deployed on mobile devices.
B. Communication Overhead
We show the communication burden of all entities in
SPOON. The public parameters are set the same as those
in the experiment, that is, |p|=160 bits and |q|=512 bits. In
user registration phase, a registrant, either customer or mobile
user, sends a registering request (I, C,C ′, Â,PK1) to the TA,
which is |I| + 2176 bits, where |I| is the binary length of
the identity, and the TA returns (A,B, s′′, t′′, e, f, P0, RK) to
the registrant, whose binary length is |P0|+ 2176 bits, where
|P0| is the binary length of credit point. In task allocation,
the customer uploads (c1, c2, c3, expires, N̂n×n, γ, w,PK2)
and the mobile user sends (µ, N˜n×n,PK3) to the service
provider, which are 4512 + 160n2 + |expires| + |γ| +
|w| bits and 2976 + 160n2 bits, respectively. The ser-
vice provider responds (num, c2, c3, c4, expires, γ), which is
2560 + |num| + |expires| + |γ| bits, to a matched mobile
user or false, 1 bit, to an unmatched one. After the mo-
bile user obtains the sensing data, it generates the sensing
report (num,Di, D′i, C
′
i, Xi, Yi, Zi, Qi, τj ,SPK) to the ser-
vice provider, which is 8864 + |num| + |P0| + |τj | bits.
The service provider needs to send 1024-bit W to the TA
if a mobile user double-submits data, and then sends w
sensing reports (num,Di, D′i, Yi, Qi, τj), which is of binary
length w ∗ (2560 + |num| + |P0| + |τj |) to the customer.
Finally, the customer returns (1024 + |γ|)-bit (i, Yi) to the
service provider for each report and the service provider sends
(Bi, t
′′
i , fi, θi, Yi) to every mobile user, which is 1856 + |P0|
binary bits.
C. Credit Analysis
To prevent credit points from disclosing to other entities,
each mobile user claims a threshold Qi, which is less than its
exact credit point Pi, such that the cloud provider can select
the sensing reports based on the claimed thresholds. In this
way, neither the cloud provider nor the customer enables to
learn the precise credit points of mobile users. Unfortunately,
this method reduces the accuracy of report selection as the
cloud provider may select a sensing report of the mobile
user, whose threshold is larger than others’, while the credit
point has the opposite result. On the other hand, customers
may prefer mobile users to choose the thresholds that are
approximate to their credit points, while the privacy of mobile
users are sacrificed. Therefore, it seems to be impossible
to reconcile the contradiction between privacy and accuracy,
because they have an opposite of trends.
To balance this trade-off, it is critical to find a reasonable
strategy for mobile users to determine the thresholds. We
define four parameters to evaluate privacy and accuracy in
credit claiming. Specifically, accuracy rate A denotes the
maximum probability of a given threshold in the selected
reports can possess top-w credit points in sensing reports.
Accuracy rate B denotes the maximum probability that a given
credit point in the sensing reports is larger than the minimum
threshold in the selected reports. Privacy rate A means the
probability that a given sensing report, whose credit point is
larger than the minimum of thresholds in selected reports, has
top-w credit point in all sensing reports. Privacy rate B means
the probability that a given sensing report would be selected
by the service provider, whose credit point is larger than the
minimum of thresholds in selected reports. To determine how
the threshold choosing strategy impacts the defined privacy
and accuracy rates, we simulate the credit points of mobile
users on Matlab and use different threshold choosing strategies
to compute the accuracy rates and the privacy rates. The
simulation results are illustrated in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. We set
the number of the mobile users to be 1000 in Fig. 5 and
the number of the selected reports to be 100 in Fig. 6. We
compare three threshold choosing strategies, the first one is
basing on uniform distribution; the second one is basing on
Gaussian distribution, in which the mean is three quarters of
credit points and the standard deviation is one quarter; the last
one is basing on Gaussian distribution, where the mean and
the standard deviation are one quarter of credit points. The
second strategy can achieve the highest accuracy and the third
strategy can achieve the best privacy preservation on credit
points in three strategies.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a strong privacy-preserving
mobile crowdsensing scheme with credit management to
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Fig. 5. Accuracy and Privacy Rates with N=1000
balance the trade-off between privacy preservation and task
allocation. The service provider is allowed to select mobile
users to perform sensing tasks according to the sensing areas of
tasks and the geographic locations of mobile users, and select
the sensing reports based on the credit points of mobile users.
The sensitive information, including identities, locations, credit
points, sensing tasks and sensing reports are preserved for
mobile users and customers during task allocation and report
selection. Furthermore, no trusted third party is required to
achieve the credit management for mobile users. In the future
work, we will design a privacy-preserving context-aware task
allocation framework for mobile crowdsensing.
APPENDIX
Details of PK1 ∼ PK3 and SPK
SPK demonstrates that the number of credit points Pi
that a mobile user has is larger than the claimed credit
threshold Qi. Thanks to the zero-knowledge range proof due
to Camenisch et al. [33], the mobile user can prove that
the value Pi − Qi is non-negative. We fix the internal of
[0, V ], where V is chosen by the service provider and is large
enough compared with the credit points of all mobile users.
Utilizing the efficient interval proofs in [34], the mobile user
demonstrates that Pi − Qi is one element in the interval
[0, V ]. To instantiate the zero-knowledge proofs PK1 ∼ PK3
and SPK, in the setup phase, the service provider generates
some auxiliary parameters y, y1, y2 ∈ G, η = yϕ for a
randomly chosen value ϕ ∈ Zp, and computes φι = y 1ι+ϕ ,
for each ι = 0 to V . To improve the efficiency, the TA can
pre-compute E0 = eˆ(g0, g), E1 = eˆ(g1, g), E2 = eˆ(g2, g),
E3 = eˆ(g3, g), E4 = eˆ(g2, S), F0 = eˆ(h0, h), F1 = eˆ(h1, h),
F2 = eˆ(h2, h), F3 = eˆ(h3, h), F4 = eˆ(h4, h), and the
service provider pre-computes K = eˆ(y, y), K0 = eˆ(y1, T ),
K ′0 = eˆ(y1, S) K1 = eˆ(y1, h), K2 = eˆ(y1, y), K3 = eˆ(y1, η).
These parameters are included in the public parameters
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Fig. 6. Accuracy and Privacy Rates with w=100
as param ∩ {E0, E1, E2, E3, E4, F0, F1, F2, F3, F4}.
The service provider also releases the parameters
{S,Lm×n, y, y1, y2, η, {φι}ι∈[0,V ],K,K0,K ′0,K1,K2,K3}.
To deduce the number of interactions in zero-knowledge
proofs, we utilize the Fiat-Shamir transformation, where the
hash function H can be viewed as a random oracle. The
details of PK1 ∼ PK3 and SPK are shown below.
PK1{(s′, t′, a) : C = gs′1 ga2 ∧ C ′ = ht
′
1 h
a
2 ∧ Â = ga}.
1) The TA sends a random challenge R ∈ Zp.
2) The registrant randomly chooses ρs′ , ρt′ , ρa ∈ Zp and
computes T1 = g
ρs′
1 g
ρa
2 , T2 = h
ρt′
1 h
ρa
2 and T3 = g
ρa .
3) The registrant computes c = H(T1, T2, T3, R).
4) The registrant computes zs′ = ρs′ − cs′, zt′ = ρt′ − ct′,
za = ρa − ca, and sends c, zs′ , zt′ , za to the TA.
5) The TA computes T ′1 = C
cg
zs′
1 g
za
2 , T
′
2 = C
′chzt′1 h
za
2 ,
T ′3 = Â
cgza and accepts the proof if c =
H(T ′1, T ′2, T ′3, R); otherwise, rejects.
PK2{(A, e, s, a, I) : eˆ(A, Tge)=eˆ(g0gs1ga2gI3 , g)}.
1) The service provider sends a random challenge R ∈ Zp.
2) The customer randomly chooses r1, r2 ∈ Zp to compute
B1 = g
r1
1 g
r2
2 , B2 = B1g
r1
2 , δ1 = r1e, δ2 = r2e. The
customer picks random ρr1 , ρr2 , ρδ1 , ρδ2 , ρe, ρs, ρa, ρI ∈
Zp and computes T1 = g
ρr1
1 g
ρr2
2 , T2 = B
−ρe
1 g
ρδ1
1 g
ρδ2
2 ,
T3 = eˆ(B2, g)
−ρeEρs1 E
ρa
2 E
ρI
3 E
ρr1
4 E
ρδ1
2 .
3) The customer computes c = H(T1, T2, T3, R).
4) The customer computes zr1 = ρr1 − cr1, zr2 = ρr2 −
cr2, zδ1 = ρδ1 − cδ1, zδ2 = ρδ2 − cδ2, ze = ρe − ce,
zs = ρs − cs, za = ρa − ca, zI = ρI − cI , and sends
c,B1, B2, zr1 , zr2 , zδ1 , zδ2 , ze, zs, za, zI to the provider.
5) The service provider computes T ′1 =
Bc1g
ρr1
1 g
ρr2
2 , T
′
2 = B
−ze
2 g
zδ1
1 g
zδ2
2 , T
′
3 =
( eˆ(B2,T )E0 )
ceˆ(B2, g)
−zeEzs1 E
za
2 E
zI
3 E
zr1
4 E
zδ1
2 and
accepts if c = H(T1, T2, T3, R); otherwise, rejects.
PK3{(Ai, ei, si, ai, Ii) : eˆ(Ai, T gei)=eˆ(g0gsi1 gai2 gIi3 , g)} is
the same as PK2
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SPK

(Bi, fi, ti, t
′
i, ai, Ii, Pi, vi) :
eˆ(Bi, Th
fi)=eˆ(h0h
ti
1 h
ai
2 h
Ii
3 h
Pi
4 , h)∧
C ′i = h
t′i
1 h
ai
2 h
Ii
3 h
Pi
4 ∧
Pi > Qi∧
Yi = H
vi∧
Zi = eˆ(g, Âi)GXivi

(num).
1) The mobile user randomly chooses r1, r2, r3, r4 ∈ Zp
to compute B1 = yr11 y
r2
2 , B2 = By
r2
1 , B3 = y
r3
1 y
r4
2 ,
B4 = φP−Qyr41 . The mobile user picks random
ρr1 , ρr2 , ρr3 , ρr4 , ρf , ρt, ρt′ , ρa, ρI , ρP , ρv, ρω1 , ρω2 , ρω3 ,
ρω4 ∈ Zp and computes T1 = hρt′1 hρa2 hρI3 hρP4 ,
T2 = y
ρr1
1 y
ρr2
2 , T3 = B
−ρf
1 y
ρω1
1 y
ρω2
2 ,
T4 = K
ρr2
0 K
ρω2
1 F
ρt
1 F
ρa
2 F
ρI
3 F
ρP
4 eˆ(B2, h)
−ρf ,
T5 = y
ρr3
1 y
ρr4
2 , T6 = B
−ρP
3 y
ρω3
1 y
ρω4
2 ,
T7 = K
ρω3
2 K
ρω4
3 eˆ(B4, y)
−ρP , T8 = Hρv , T9 = GXρv .
2) The user computes c =
H(T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7, T8, T9, num).
3) The user computes zr1 = ρr1 − cr1, zr2 = ρr2 − cr2,
zr3 = ρr3 − cr3, zr4 = ρr4 − cr4, zf = ρf − cf ,
zt = ρt−ct, zt′ = ρt′−ct′, za = ρa−ca, zI = ρI−cI ,
zP = ρP − cP , zv = ρv − cv, zω1 = ρω1 − cr1ω1,
zω2 = ρω2 − cr2ω2, zω3 = ρω3 − c(P − Q)ω3, zω4 =
ρω4−c(P −Q)ω4, and sends c,B1, B2, B3, B4, zr1 , zr2 ,
zr3 , zr4 , zf , zt, zt′ , za, zI , zP , zv, zω1 , zω2 , zω3 , zω4 to
the service provider.
4) The service provider computes T ′1 = C
′chzt′1 h
za
2 h
zI
3 h
zP
4 ,
T ′2 = B
c
1y
zr1
1 y
zr2
2 , T
′
3 = B
−zf
1 y
zω1
1 y
zω2
2 , T
′
4 =
( eˆ(B2,T )F0 )
cK
zr2
0 K
zω2
1 F
zt
1 F
za
2 F
zI
3 F
zP
4 eˆ(B2, h)
−zf , T ′5 =
Bc3y
zr3
1 y
zr4
2 , T
′
6 = B
−Qc
3 B
−zP
3 y
zω3
1 y
zω4
2 , T
′
7 =
( eˆ(B4,ηy
−Q)
K )
cK
zω3
2 K
zω4
3 eˆ(B4, y)
−zP , T ′8 = Y
cHzv ,
T ′9 = (
Z
eˆ(g,Â)
)cGXzv , and accepts the proof if c = H(T ′1,
T ′2, T
′
3, T
′
4, T
′
5, T
′
6, T
′
7, T
′
8, T
′
9, num); otherwise, rejects.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Ni, K. Zhang, X. Lin, Q. Xia, and X. Shen, “Privacy-preserving mobile
crowdsensing for location-based applications,” in Proc. ICC, 2017, pp.
1–6.
[2] R.K. Ganti, F. Ye, and H. Lei, “Mobile crowdsensing: Current state and
future challenges,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 49, no. 11, pp. 32–39,
2011.
[3] Y. Hui, Z. Su, and S. Guo, “Utility based data computing scheme to
provide sensing service in Internet of Things,” IEEE Trans. Emerging
Tpoics in Computing, to appear.
[4] A. Doan, R. Ramakrishnan, and A.Y. Halevy, “Crowdsourcing systems
on the world-wide web,” Commun. ACM, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 86–96,
2011.
[5] X. Zhang, Z. Yang, Y. Liu, J. Li, and Z. Ming, “Toward efficient
mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol.
66, no. 2, pp. 1760–1771, 2017.
[6] L. Xiao, T. Chen, C. Xie, H. Dai, and H.V. Poor, “Mobile crowdsensing
games in vehicular networks,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., to appear.
[7] K. Yang, K. Zhang, J. Ren, and X. Shen, “Security and privacy in mobile
crowdsourcing networks: Challenges and opportunities,” IEEE Commun.
Mag., vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 75–81, 2015.
[8] I. Krontiris, M. Langheinrich, and K. Shilton, “Trust and privacy in mo-
bile experience sharing: Further challenges, and avenues for research,”
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 52, no. 8, pp. 50–55, 2014.
[9] J. Ni, A. Zhang, X. Lin, and X. Shen, “Security, privacy and fairness in
fog-based vehicular crowdsensing,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 55, no.
6, pp. 146–152, 2017.
[10] C. Cornelius, A. Kapadia, D. Kotz, D. Peebles, M. Shin, and N.
Triandopoulos, “AnonySense: Privacy-aware people-centric sensing,” in
Proc. Mobisys, 2008, pp. 211–224.
[11] K.L. Huang, S.S. Kanhere, and W. Hu,“A privacy-preserving reputation
system for participatory sensing,” in Proc. LCN, 2012, pp. 10–18.
[12] T. Dimitriou, I. Krontiris, and A. Sabouri, “PEPPeR: A querier privacy
enhancing protocol for participatory sensing,” in Proc. MobiSec, 2012,
pp. 93–106.
[13] F. Qiu, F. Wu, and G. Chen, “Privacy and quality preserving multimedia
data aggregation for participatory sensing system,” IEEE Trans. Mob.
Comput., vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 1287–1299, 2015.
[14] H. Zang and J. Bolot, ”Anonymization of location data does not work: A
large-scale measurement study,” in Proc. MobiCom, 2011, pp. 145–156.
[15] J. Ren, Y. Zhang, K. Zhang, and X. Shen, “SACRM: Social aware
crowdsourcing with reputation management in mobile sensing,” Comput.
Commun., vol. 65, pp. 55–65, 2015.
[16] H. Mousa, S.B. Mokhtar, O. Hasan, O. Younes, M. Hadhoud, and L.
Brunie, “Trust management and reputation systems in mobile participa-
tory sensing applications: A survey,” Comput. Netw., vol. 90, no. 29, pp.
49–73, 2015.
[17] X. Wang, W. Cheng, P. Mohapatra, and T. Abdelzaher, “Enabling
reputation and trust in privacy-preserving mobile sensing,” IEEE Trans.
Mob. Comput., vol. 13, no. 12, pp. 2777–2789, 2014.
[18] L. Pournajaf, L. Xiong, V. Sunderam, and S. Goryczka, “Spatial task
assignment for crowd sensing with cloaked locations,” in Proc. MDM,
2014, pp. 73–82.
[19] D. Christin, J. Guillemet, A. Reinhardt, M. Hollick, and S.S. Kanhere,
“Privacy-preserving collaborative path hiding for participatory sensing
applications,” in Proc. MASS, 2011, pp. 341–350.
[20] E.D. Cristofaro and C. Soriente, “Extended capabilities for a privacy-
enhanced participatory sensing infrastructure (PEPSI),” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensic Secur., vol. 8, no. 12, pp. 2021–2033, 2013.
[21] F. Gu¨nther, M. Manulis, and A. Peter, “Privacy-enhanced participatory
sensing with collision resistance and data aggregation,” in Proc. CANS,
2014, pp. 321–336.
[22] J. Zhou, Z. Cao, and X. Dong, “Secure and efficient fine-grained multiple
file sharing in cloud-assisted crowd sensing networks,” Peer Peer Netw.
Appl., vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 1–21, 2016.
[23] X. Chen, X. Wu, X.-Y. Li, Y. He, and Y. Liu, “Privacy-preserving
high-quality map generation with participatory sensing,” in Proc. IEEE
INFOCOM, 2014, pp. 2310–2318.
[24] H. Jin, L. Su, H. Xiao, and K. Nahrstedt, “Inception: Incentivizing
privacy-preserving data aggregation for mobile crowd sensing systems,”
in Proc. MobiHoc, vol. 16, 2016, pp. 341–350.
[25] L. Kazemi and C. Shahabi, “TAPAS: Trustworthy privacy-aware partic-
ipatory sensing,” Knowl. Inf. Syst., vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 105–128, 2013
[26] H. To, G. Ghinita, and C. Shahabi, “A framework for protecting worker
location privacy in spatial crowdsourcing,” in Proc. VLDB, vol. 7, no.
10, pp. 919–930, 2014.
[27] L. Kazemi, C. Shahabi, and L. Chen,“Geotrucrowd: trustworthy query
answering with spatial crowdsourcing,” in Proc. ACM SIGSPATIAL GIS,
2013, pp. 314-323.
[28] D. Christin, C. Rokopf, M. Hollick, L.A. Martucci, and S.S. Kanhere,
“IncogniSense: An anonymity-preserving reputation framework for par-
ticipatory sensing applications,” Pervasive Mob. Comput., vol. 9, no. 3,
pp. 353–371, 2013.
[29] M.H. Au, W. Susilo, and Y. Mu, “Constant-size dynamic k-TAA,” in
Proc. SCN, 2006, pp. 111–125.
[30] G. Ateniese, K. Fu, M. Green, and S. Hohenberger, “Improved proxy
re-encryption schemes with applications to secure distributed storage,”
in Proc. NDSS, 2005, pp. 29–43.
[31] D. Cash, E. Kiltz, and V. Shoup, “The twin Diffie-Hellman problem and
applications,” in Proc. Eurocrypt, 2008, pp. 127–145.
[32] D. Boneh, E.-J. Goh, and K. Nissim, “Evaluating 2-DNF formulas on
ciphertexts,” in Proc. TCC, 2005, pp. 325–341.
[33] J. Camenisch, R. Chaabouni, and A. Shela, “Efficient protocols for set
membership and range proofs,” in Proc. Asiacrypt, 2008, pp. 234–252.
[34] M.H. Au, J.K. Liu, J. Fang, Z.L. Jiang, W. Susilo, and J. Zhou, “A new
payment system for enhancing location privacy of electric vehicles,”
IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 63, no, 1, pp. 3–18, 2014.
